Institutional barriers and industry dynamics by Chang, Sea‐jin & Wu, Brian
Strategic Management Journal
Strat. Mgmt. J., 35: 1103–1123 (2014)
Published online EarlyView 2 August 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/smj.2152
Received 23 May 2011 ; Final revision received 25 May 2013
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS AND INDUSTRY
DYNAMICS
SEA-JIN CHANG1,2* and BRIAN WU3
1 NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, Singapore
2 Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Seoul, South Korea
3 Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
U.S.A.
This study demonstrates that new entrants exhibit higher productivity but also higher exit hazard
than incumbents in post-liberalization China. We argue this seemingly paradoxical relationship
is attributable to institutional barriers, defined as the hindrance in the institutional environment
that prevents market selection forces to function. New entrants require higher productivity to
compensate for those institutional barriers, which in turn implies a higher exit hazard after
controlling for productivity. Our empirical findings support this argument and further show that
the differences in productivity and exit hazard between new entrants and incumbents become
smaller where and when institutional barriers recede. By integrating economic and institutional
perspectives, we highlight the importance of institutional factors in shaping industry evolution.
Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with Schumpeter’s seminal work
(Schumpeter, 1934), a central question for busi-
ness scholars is how the competitive interaction
between new entrants and incumbents shapes
the process of industry evolution (Agarwal,
Sarkar, and Echambadi, 2002; Geroski, 1995;
Stinchcombe, 1965). To account for this process,
the economics literature develops models in which
market entry and exit are determined by economic
efficiency (Hopenhayn, 1992; Jovanovic, 1982;
Melitz, 2003). Originally developed in free-market
economies, these models often assume away the
institutional environment, predicting a one-to-one
correspondence between productivity and survival
(Baldwin, 1995; Syverson, 2011). We extend
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this literature to a setting where the impact
of economic forces on industry evolution is
moderated by institutional factors. In the context
of post-liberalization China, we find that new
entrants have higher productivity than incumbents,
but despite their higher productivity, they are also
more likely to fail, creating a divergence between
productivity and survival.
We argue this seemingly paradoxical relation-
ship can be attributed to institutional barriers,
defined as the hindrance in the institutional envi-
ronment that prevents market selection forces to
function (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Luo and
Junkunc, 2008; Tybout, 2000). These institutional
barriers create persistent survival advantages for
incumbent firms independent of their productivity,
which increase the fixed costs of doing business for
new entrants. As a consequence, only new entrants
with higher productivity are able to enter and
operate in the industry. Thus, institutional barriers
truncate the productivity distribution of potential
entrants, raising the average productivity of actual
entrants. Meanwhile, new entrants are more likely
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to exit after controlling for productivity, reflecting
their survival disadvantages stemming from insti-
tutional barriers.
This study employs two empirical strategies to
support these arguments. First, we jointly exam-
ine productivity and exit hazards. A divergence
between these two variables according to entry
timing suggests the existence of institutional bar-
riers. Second, we explore whether such a diver-
gence would vary according to the changes in
institutional environments. To test this idea, we
exploit institutional variations generated by the
gradual reform process in China and adopt the
difference-in-difference approach (Rajan and Zin-
gales, 1998; Samaniego, 2009). If we find the
divergence between productivity and exit hazard
varies systematically with the magnitude of insti-
tutional barriers, we can offer stronger evidence for
the role of institutional factors in shaping industry
evolution. We find empirical support for these intu-
itions using census data from the Chinese National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) from 1998 to 2007.
This study seeks to improve our understanding
of industry evolution by introducing insights from
institutional theory into the established economics
models that assumed away institutional environ-
ments. By examining the divergence between effi-
ciency and survival, we offer an institution-based
perspective to understand the long-standing debate
whether new entrants are productive enough to
replace incumbents (Schumpeter, 1934, 1942).
This perspective may be particularly relevant in
settings where institutional barriers are significant.
We also aim to contribute to institutional the-
ory by identifying a novel theoretical mechanism
through which institutional factors affect economic
outcomes. As the term ‘liability’ implies, the lia-
bility of newness literature has primarily focused
on how institutional barriers lead to negative sur-
vival outcomes for new entrants (Stinchcombe,
1965). Adding to this literature, we identify cir-
cumstances in which institutional barriers lead to
positive productivity outcomes for new entrants. In
doing so, we respond to a call from the recent insti-
tutional theory literature that emphasizes the need
to isolate the specific mechanisms by which ‘iden-
tical’ institutional forces can result in . . . divergent
outcomes (Scott, 2008: 177; italics added by
authors). This research further extends the liter-
ature that examines the impact of environmental
changes on the relative advantage of new entrants
vis-a`-vis incumbents (Agarwal et al., 2002; Sarkar
et al., 2006). We explicitly consider the interplay
between entry/exit dynamics and institutional vari-
ations, shedding new light on industry evolution in
the context of institutional changes.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
We define institutions as the basic rules of the
game, such as legal regimes and the way they are
enforced, widely held norms that constrain behav-
ior, and organizing principles of economic activity
(North, 1990). Institutional barriers are the hin-
drance in the institutional environment that pre-
vent the market selection mechanism from func-
tioning properly. Institutional barriers can result
from inadequate institutional infrastructure, such
as poorly specified property rights and contract
laws (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Nee, 1992),
institutional voids, such as underdeveloped labor
and capital markets (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), or
institutional susceptibility (or institutional obsta-
cles), such as excessive regulatory requirements
and requests for bribery (Luo and Junkunc, 2008;
Tybout, 2000). We use the term institutional bar-
riers following the spirit of ‘barriers to survival’,
introduced by Geroski (1995: 424) to denote the
stylized fact that ‘the survival rate of most entrants
is low’. This concept allows us to examine how
institutional transitions moderate industry evolu-
tion, a process similar to the effect the structural
shift of technological regimes has on the produc-
tivity and the survival likelihood of new entrants
(Agarwal et al., 2002; Sarkar et al., 2006). Specifi-
cally, we investigate how institutional barriers cre-
ate a wedge, leading to the divergence between
productivity and survival according to entry tim-
ing. We draw on two streams of literature: industry
dynamics and institutional buffering, and develop
a theoretical framework by integrating them.
Industry dynamics and institutional buffering
Understanding industry dynamics is important
for researchers in economics and strategy. The
economic literature has focused on the impact
of efficiency on firm survival. According to
Jovanovic’s (1982) model, firms possess different
levels of efficiency, as determined by a random
draw upon entry, which remains fixed over time.
Firms know only the distribution of this draw,
not their exact efficiency level; they must update
efficiency expectations based on past performance.
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More efficient firms choose to stay in business and
expand, while less efficient firms contract and exit.
Hopenhayn (1992) extends Jovanovic’s model
by assuming that, after firms draw their initial
productivity level from the same distribution, they
are subject to firm-specific productivity shocks
following a Markov process. Firms exit when their
expected profits based on realized productivity
cannot cover fixed costs. New firms continue to
enter until the expected profits of entry are equal to
the cost of entry. This process leads to a stationary
equilibrium with simultaneous entry and exit, as
well as heterogeneous size and growth rates. These
models have been enriched in various theoretical
settings (Asplund and Nocke, 2006; Ericson and
Pakes, 1995; Melitz, 2003), evolving into a plat-
form for empirical research to understand the rela-
tionship between economic efficiency and industry
turnover (cf., Bartelsman and Doms, 2000;
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2009).
While the industry evolution models outlined
above provide a basis to study economic effi-
ciency, they often assume away institutional
factors, resulting in a one-to-one correspondence
between productivity and survival. In reality,
however, industry evolution can be interrupted by
government regulation and distorted by institu-
tional barriers. For example, firms in transitional
economies, such as China, are subject to both
market forces and institutional legacies from
the planned economy. Thus, it is important for
economic theory to be informed by institutional
theory when examining the process of industry
evolution in the face of institutional changes.
Organization researchers have long argued that
institutional forces may buffer incumbents from
selection pressures regardless of their economic
efficiency, a mechanism in the literature known as
institutional buffering (Aldrich, 1979, 1999). Insti-
tutional theorists propose that legitimacy, social
support, and approval from external constituents
in the institutional environment improve the like-
lihood of an organization’s survival (DiMag-
gio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Scott, 1983;
Oliver, 1991). Organizations can gain approval
and endorsement by building strong connections
with established social actors in the institutional
environment, through sources including political
parties, government relations, charitable organi-
zations, or ‘guanxi’ (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Li
and Zhang, 2007; Miner, Amburgey, and Stearns,
1990; Park and Luo, 2001). Thus, organizations
choose ‘legitimation-based strategies’ to increase
their chances for survival (Suchman, 1995; Zim-
merman and Zeitz, 2002).
In social and institutional interactions, in
general, it is harder to trust a newcomer, so
new organizations face challenges in developing
long-lasting relationships with other players in
the institutional environment (Singh, Tucker, and
House, 1986; Stinchcombe, 1965). As a conse-
quence, older incumbent organizations tend to
be viewed as more reliable and accountable than
new outfits. Incumbent firms, even less productive
ones, can survive without exit. DiMaggio and
Powell (1983: 149) point out that ‘a wide range of
factors—institutional commitment, elite sponsor-
ship, and government support in terms of open-end
contracts, subsidy, tariff barriers and import quo-
tas, or favorable tax law—reduce selection pres-
sures even in a competitive organizational field’.
Such institutional buffering effects, by definition
independent of productivity, can take either intan-
gible forms, such as legitimacy (Suchman, 1995;
Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), or tangible forms,
such as government contracts or direct subsidy
(Nee and Opper, 2010). In practice, institutional
buffering works by providing resources to firms.
For example, as our field interview shows, a loss-
making state-owned enterprise might secure a loan
from state banks to pay its workers and suppliers
to remain viable (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland,
2003).1 Given the carrying capacity of a particular
industry, a larger number of surviving incumbents
creates higher selection pressure for new entrants.
While it is possible for new entrants to gain or
develop their own institutional buffering to neutral-
ize incumbents’ advantages, it is difficult to elim-
inate the gap completely in a short period of time
because it takes significant investment and time to
develop and cultivate institutional ties (Park and
Luo, 2001). In effect, newer entrants may continue
to be disadvantaged due to time compression
diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989).
Given their relative disadvantage in institutional
buffering, new entrants need to consider alternative
1 Most of the examples in this article are drawn from the
field interviews we conducted in China, covering regions
with different degrees of market development and government
interventions, companies of different size and industries, and
various industry participants including managers, consultants,
and bankers. Overall, these field interviews support the validity
of our theoretical constructs and resonate with our findings from
the large-sample analysis.
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strategies to conform with the given institutional
environment. A clear alternative strategy is to
enter with superior efficiency to overcome insti-
tutional barriers, which we label ‘efficiency-based
strategies’. There has been little research on how
institutional buffering affects efficiency outcomes,
since the institutional buffering literature has
focused on how institutional factors buffer firms
from selection forces, i.e., survival outcomes. Just
as existing economic models assume away institu-
tional factors, the institutional buffering literature
does not examine the consequences of efficiency.
While this assumption may be appropriate when
studying nonprofit organizations (Singh et al.,
1986), relaxing this assumption improves our
understanding of economic efficiency, another
important performance criterion of industry
evolution. To address this issue, we integrate the
industry dynamics and institutional buffering lit-
eratures by examining how institutional buffering
influences economic efficiency.
We formalize these arguments by incorporating
institutional barriers into the established industry
economic models. Institutional barriers increase
the fixed costs of doing business for new entrants
vis-a`-vis incumbents (Melitz, 2003). We consider
institutional buffering not as a one-time cost
of entry but as fixed costs of doing business,
because the impact of institutional buffering on
survival may persist over time. For example,
in the early stages of China’s gradual reform
process, the market was not fully liberalized and
market selection forces did not fully function to
determine entry and exit. New entrants found it
difficult to compete with loss-making incumbent
firms that undercut prices based on subsidies from
the government. Institutional buffering truncates
the productivity distribution of new entrants since
only firms that can afford to pay additional
fixed costs can enter and operate in the industry.
Because firms with low productivity cannot afford
the extra fixed costs of doing business, the
average productivity of entrants in this truncated
distribution will rise in proportion to the amount
of the fixed costs. This argument fits well with
existing models on industry dynamics. In the
Melitz (2003) and Hopenhayn (1992) models, both
efficient and inefficient firms can enter ex ante
since they do not know their exact productivity but
only more efficient firms can survive ex post . Thus,
it appears that, on average and in equilibrium,
later cohorts are more efficient than early cohorts.
Alternatively, if we assume that firms have some
knowledge of their actual productivity level before
entry, as in Klepper (1996), the existence of
institutional buffering lets only more efficient firms
enter in later cohorts. Thus, according to either line
of models, conceptualizing institutional buffering
as fixed costs suggests that new entrants will have
higher productivity than incumbents.
This conceptualization, from the perspective of
institutional theory, also implies that new entrants
pursue efficiency-based strategies in response to
institutional pressures. For example, a new entrant
might have to develop more innovative designs
and services of higher quality to compete with
well-connected incumbent firms that undercut
competition based on a government subsidy. This
mechanism, in fact, resonates with a related insight
by Stinchcombe (1965: 148): ‘If an alternative
requires new organization, it has to be much more
beneficial than the old before the flow of benefits
compensates for the relative weakness of the newer
social structure’. Stinchcombe’s original insight,
however, has not been leveraged in the subse-
quent literature on ‘liability of newness’, which
tends to focus on survival outcomes. We return to
this important, yet under-studied, aspect of Stinch-
combe’s original arguments, using it as a lens to
integrate insights from both the economics theory
and the institutional theory literature. New entrants
could resort to efficiency rather than conforming to
the institutional environment in order to survive.
Such a balanced view allows us to contribute a
novel theoretical explanation to the divergent out-
comes or organizational heterogeneity existing in
the same general environment (Scott, 2008).
Based on these arguments, we expect that new
entrants should exhibit higher productivity to
compensate for the liability of newness arising
from institutional buffering. Correspondingly, if
we examine firms’ survival rates after controlling
for their productivity, we expect that new entrants
are more likely to exit than incumbent firms. Such
a difference in the exit rate between incumbents
and new entrants, when productivity is controlled
for, reflects the incumbent’s survival advantage
granted by institutional buffering. In effect,
institutional barriers play a dual role in leading
to the divergent prediction on the productivity
and survival of new entrants vis-a`-vis incum-
bent firms: on one hand, they require a higher
productivity for new entrants to compensate for
their survival disadvantage; on the other hand,
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they allow incumbents a higher survival rate than
new entrants at the same level of productivity.
Therefore, we expect a divergence between
productivity and survival to exist where and when
there are institutional barriers. In order to test
this hypothesis, we need to examine jointly both
productivity and exit hazard of firms according to
their entry timing. Thus, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 1 : A divergence exists between
productivity and survival according to entry
timing where and when there are institutional
barriers: (a) new entrants are more productive
than incumbent firms; (b) new entrants are
also more likely to exit, controlling for their
productivity .
Institutional variations
Stinchcombe (1965) notes that the institutional
environment can change to alleviate the liabil-
ity of newness. For example, if a society pro-
vides stronger infrastructure to offer new entrants
access to financial resources and intermediary
services, then the liability of newness will be
lower, because new entrants’ lack of social
and political connections can be mitigated by
market-based institutions. Extending this logic,
we argue that reducing institutional barriers will
narrow the divergence between productivity and
survival.
Institutional barriers vary greatly from region to
region and from time to time. For example, China
consists of heterogeneous provinces with different
degrees of market development and openness to
competition due to its gradual reform policy (Nee,
1992; Walder, 1995). In 2007, it took 29 days to
register a commercial property in Shanghai, but
it took 78 days in Lanzhou, the capital city of an
inland province. Similarly, the time Chinese firms
spent interacting with government bureaucracies
ranged from 36 days/year at the top 10th per-
centile of cities to 87 days/year at the bottom 10th
percentile of cities (World Bank, 2006, 2008).
When excessive regulatory compliance occupies
valuable firm resources of managerial time and
attention, it acts as an institutional barrier or
fixed cost. Therefore, it is important to under-
stand how institutional variations affect industry
dynamics. China’s gradual reform process creates
a quasi-experimental setting to examine the
impact of variation in institutional environments
across regions, while controlling for country-level
unobserved heterogeneity.
It is also important to consider the temporal
dimension of industry evolution because institu-
tional barriers also change over time, especially in
transitional economies. China has evolved from a
reforming economy fraught with political uncer-
tainty to one more favorable to entrepreneurial
activities (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Luo,
2003; Tan and Tan, 2005). The general environ-
ment has changed from one where institutional
dimensions are important to one where technical
dimensions are becoming more important. For
example, as our field interviews confirm, a
rapidly growing venture capital industry allows
new entrants to raise capital to compete with
established incumbent firms (Ahlstrom, Bruton,
and Yeh, 2007), although the incumbent firms may
have preferential access to bank loans based on
social relations. Similarly, new entrants can rely on
market-based intermediaries for legal, accounting,
and information services, even if they lack social
connections (Zhang and Li, 2010). In these cases,
new entrants are less disadvantaged compared
with incumbent firms due to improved institu-
tional infrastructure and market institutions (Li
and Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Nee, 1992). Further-
more, while China’s overall liberalization process
is gradual, its 2001 entry into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was a major event with a
fundamental impact on further liberalization. Var-
ious reforms geared toward domestic firms—e.g.,
the legalization of private firms and relaxation
of bankruptcy procedures for state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs)—preceded the WTO entry to
prepare for full-scale competition with foreign
firms.
Following from these discussions, we expect the
divergence between productivity and survival to
narrow when institutional barriers decrease. When
institutional buffering is reduced by the removal of
institutional barriers, the fixed costs of doing busi-
ness are reduced. Thus, the decrease in institutional
barriers is associated with a lower threshold that
truncates the productivity distribution for entrants.
With a decrease in the threshold, the observed
average productivity of the truncated distribution
for new entrants will become lower. Therefore,
the productivity difference between new entrants
and incumbents, i.e., new entrants’ superior
productivity requirement to compensate for the
institutional buffering effect, is reduced when
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institutional barriers are lowered. Correspondingly,
when we examine firms’ survival rates after con-
trolling for productivity, the survival disadvantage
of new entrants is lower when institutional bar-
riers are lower. To test this hypothesis, we need
to examine jointly both productivity and exit haz-
ard of firms according to their entry timing when
institutional barriers change. We thus have the fol-
lowing hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 : The divergence between pro-
ductivity and survival according to entry tim-
ing decreases when institutional barriers are
reduced : a) the productivity gap between new
entrants and incumbent firm, as observed in
hypothesis 1a, is reduced when institutional bar-
riers are lower ; b) the survival rate difference
between new entrants and incumbent firm, as
observed in hypothesis 1b, is reduced when insti-
tutional barriers are lower.
RESEARCH METHODS
Empirical setting
China’s recent liberalization process provides an
ideal empirical setting to test our hypotheses on
how various degrees of institutional barriers affect
the industry dynamics between new entrants and
incumbent firms. Prior to 1978, China was a
planned economy dominated by state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs). SOEs had little control over their
operations and no incentive to improve cost effi-
ciency or product quality. As a result, industry in
China was characterized by inefficiency and stag-
nation (Rawski, 1980). Beginning in 1978, China
sought to address these issues with the adoption
of a ‘reform and open-door policy’, which cat-
alyzed the transition from a planned economy
to a market economy. This liberalization process
can be divided into three major phases: the grad-
ual reform phase (1978–1992), the liberalization
phase (1993–1998), and the post-liberalization
phase (1998–present).
During the first phase of the reform, China
opted to undergo a gradual transition rather than
the ‘big bang’ approach taken by former Soviet
Bloc nations, where SOEs were immediately pri-
vatized en masse. Through a gradual approach, the
Chinese government sought to increase the effi-
ciency of SOEs by providing them with increased
autonomy and incentives. At the same time, the
Chinese government sought to address demands
unmet by SOEs by allowing non-SOEs—private
firms, collective firms, and foreign firms (mainly
in joint ventures)—to enter the market. The entry
of non-SOEs was facilitated by introducing a
dual-track pricing system whereby market sup-
ply and demand determined the price of inputs
and outputs above and beyond the predetermined
quota. Despite these capitalist elements, the pri-
mary purpose of the first phase of the reform was
to enhance the efficiency of SOEs while avoid-
ing their collapse from competitive market forces
(Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000). As such, non-SOEs
were treated as a supplement to, rather than a
replacement for, SOEs.
China’s decentralized economic structure facili-
tated this gradual reform approach to economic lib-
eralization. Each region in China historically oper-
ated as a self-contained market in which a variety
of industries operate under the control of regional
governments, analogous to the M-form organiza-
tion structure (Chandler, 1962). This decentralized
structure helped economic liberalization by pro-
moting the entry and expansion of non-SOEs for
two reasons: regional governments had incentives
to promote non-SOEs as an important source of
regional economic growth; and the central gov-
ernment could experiment with liberalization by
introducing non-SOEs at the regional level and, if
successful, diffuse the practices across the nation
(Qian, Roland, and Xu, 1999, 2006).
Although the first phase of the reform in China
generated encouraging results, two lingering
issues prevented further economic growth. First,
SOEs experienced limited gains in efficiency,
primarily due to vague property rights. Second, the
decentralized market structure of China implies
the objective of each region is to maximize local
economic growth, but not necessarily national
economic efficiency. This decentralized structure
often leads to regional protectionism, duplicative
investments, and misallocation of resources
(Young, 2000). This second issue is exacerbated
because the political careers of regional leaders
are closely tied to the economic performance of
their own regions vis-a`-vis other regions (Li and
Zhou, 2005).
In response to these problems, the Chinese gov-
ernment shifted reform policy to facilitate owner-
ship restructuring and promote market competition
during the second phase of reform (1993–1998)
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(Jefferson et al., 1999; Wu, 2005). This phase
was initiated in November, 1993 by the National
Congress of the Communist Party of China
(NCCPC), which proclaimed the establishment of
a ‘socialist market economy’ and a modern cor-
porate system as its primary goals. In Decem-
ber 1993, the NCCPC passed the Corporate Law,
which facilitated the privatization and corporati-
zation of former SOEs and collective firms. In
September 1997, the NCCPC officially recognized
the political legitimacy of non-SOEs as integral
to the socialist market economy. Also in 1997,
the Chinese government issued policies to facil-
itate the bankruptcy of insolvent SOEs. In addi-
tion, private ownership was explicitly legalized
in a 1998 constitutional amendment. The domes-
tic policy reform coincided with the relaxation
of restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI).
Beginning with the establishment of four special
economic zones in 1980, China has pursued an
open-door policy to attract FDI, mainly through
joint ventures. With China’s accession to the WTO
in 2001, foreign firms could maintain full owner-
ship and acquire local firms in most nonstrategic
industries. As a consequence, FDI inflow increased
dramatically.
Through ownership restructuring reforms and
an evolving open-door policy, including WTO
membership, during the third phase of reform
(1998–2007) China came to share important fea-
tures with other nations characterized by free
market economies. Firms with different owner-
ship types were allowed to compete with each
other, and, as a result, many local and foreign
firms exited. These three phases in China’s grad-
ual reform policy generated institutional varia-
tions along the dimensions of region and time.
Competition and market selection also vary along
these dimensions. These variations present a con-
text that allows us to examine the institutional
buffering mechanism behind productivity and exit
hazard differences between new entrants and
incumbents.
Data
We use annual industrial survey data from the Chi-
nese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) to test
our hypotheses. This database includes financial
information for industrial firms with annual sales
of at least 5 million Chinese yuan (RMB) (roughly
U.S. $680,000, according to the official 2007
exchange rate) from 1998 to 2007. The annual
number of observations ranged from 162,033 to
336,768 belonging to a total of 557,554 firms.
(By law, all firms in China are required to par-
ticipate in the NBS survey.) Several recent studies
use the annual industrial firms database (Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2011; Chang and Xu,
2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Park, Li, and Tse,
2006; Zhang et al., 2010). While this database has
an advantage in creating a panel with its unique
firm identifier, it has a limitation in that it con-
tains only firms with 5 million RMB or more in
sales. To overcome this firm size restriction, we
also test our hypotheses using the NBS economy-
wide census in 2004, in which all 1.19 million
industrial firms participated, regardless of annual
sales. We perform further robustness checks using
this full census and additional subsample analy-
ses (discussed later). If firms undergo restructur-
ing sufficiently significant to require an identifier
change, we consider them different firms. Alter-
natively, we consider them the same by matching
them based on demographic information, and rede-
fine entry and exit accordingly. Our results do not
vary with this alternative approach. Figure 1 shows
the composition of firms in our sample. Figure 1(a)
presents a general trend, showing that the propor-
tion of SOEs and collectives among firms in the
annual industrial survey declines over time, while
that of private, incorporated, and foreign firms
increases. Figure 1(b) shows the number of firms
by entry year. While some firms trace their estab-
lishment year as far back as 1817, many more firms
were established after 1978, when China began to
pursue economic reform. Figure 1(b) also shows
the number of exits during the 1999–2004 time
period, when we observe exits.
Measurements
We measure entry year as the calendar year in
which a firm was established, as recorded in the
NBS database. Exit is a dichotomous variable that
records the exit event when a given firm identifier
at time t does not reappear in the database at
time t + 1. However, there is a possibility that
a firm may have been removed from the annual
industrial survey database because sales dipped
below 5 million RMB. To address this problem,
we record exit only when the disappearing firm
does not reappear in the 2004 economy-wide
census. For example, if a firm exists in the 2001
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Figure 1. Sample composition
annual industrial survey database but disappears
in the 2002 version, we code it as an exit in
2002 only if the same firm does not appear
in the 2004 economy-wide census. Using this
approach, we exclude cases of false exit when a
firm’s sales dips below the 5 M RMB threshold.
Roughly 1.3 percent of firms that disappear from
the annual industrial survey still exist in the 2004
economy-wide census, implying that their sales
dipped below the 5 million RMB threshold. Given
the need to cross-check exits from the annual
surveys with the 2004 economy-wide census, we
are able to define exit only during the 1998–2004
period.
We measure institutional barriers with the mar-
ketization index, constructed annually from 1998
to 2007 by the National Economic Research Insti-
tute (NERI). The marketization index contains five
major fields capturing the progress of marketi-
zation along different dimensions in each of the
31 provinces in each year. Its major categories
include: (1) the relation between the government
and the market, (2) the development of the non-
state sector, (3) the development of the product
market, (4) the development of the factor market,
and (5) the development of market intermediaries
and the legal environment. Each major category
contains several subindices, totaling 23 subindices.
The subindices are constructed based on data from
the National Bureau of Statistics of China and sur-
veys conducted by NERI. The NERI marketization
index forms a panel, showing the relative progress
of marketization across different regions over time
in China (see Appendix for more information).
This index is a suitable measure since a higher
degree of marketization reflects fewer institutional
barriers. Incumbents are favored because they have
developed strong connections with the govern-
ments while it is costly for new entrants to catch
up quickly due to time-compression diseconomies.
Such connections offer incumbents survival advan-
tages when the market is not fully developed. For
example, reflected in category (1) of the NERI
index, if the state still dominates resource allo-
cation through state-owned banks, loss-making
incumbents can remain viable by getting easier
access to credit. Our field research, discussed in the
theory section, supports this operationalization. We
perform robustness tests with alternative measures
for institutional barriers.
In terms of ownership structure, we classify
firms into five categories: foreign firms , two types
of modern local firms (private firms and incorpo-
rated firms), and two types of conventional local
firms (SOEs and collectives). These five firm
types represent different levels of technological
competency and incentive schemes. For this set of
firm-type variables, we take SOEs as the reference
category. Firm size is measured as a firm’s
output in billion RMB at time t . In addition, we
control for industry, region, and year fixed effects.
We employ the 3-digit SIC as our definition of
industry.
We measure firm productivity using a multilat-
eral index developed by Caves, Christensen, and
Diewert (1982) and later modified by Aw, Chung,
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and Roberts (2003).
Productivityit =
(
lnYit − lnYt
)
+
t∑
τ=2
(lnYτ − lnYτ−1) − [
m∑
j=1
1
2
(Sijt + Sjt )
(lnXijt − lnXjt ) +
t∑
τ=2
m∑
j=1
1
2
(
Sjτ + Sjτ−1
)
(lnXjτ − lnXjτ−1)] (1)
where i denotes firm, t year, and j type of input
(j = 1, . . . ,m). Yit denotes output, and Xijt denotes
inputs including labor input, material input, and
capital stock. Sijt denotes input shares, defined as
the ratio of labor costs to output for labor input,
the ratio of material costs to output for material
input, and one minus labor share and material share
for capital input. The first term in Equation (1)
captures the deviation of a firm’s output in year
t from the industry average output in that year.
The second term reflects the cumulative change
in industry average output between year t and
the initial year. The third and fourth terms repeat
the same for each input j , which are summed
using input share for each firm (Sijt) and the
average input share for each 3-digit industry (Sjt
in the third term and Sjτ−1 in the fourth term)
in each year as weights. The productivity index
measures the proportional difference between the
productivity of firm i in year t relative to the
hypothetical firm in the base year. (See File S1 on
how we calculate inputs and outputs to measure
productivity appropriately.)
This productivity index has several advantages
over conventional parametric measures, e.g., the
residuals from the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion and its variants. This index is straightforward
in computation and flexible in allowing hetero-
geneous production technology. Given that firms
with varying degrees of technological sophistica-
tion compete with each other in China, this flex-
ibility makes it particularly relevant to our set-
ting. According to Van Biesebroeck (2007: 529),
who examines the robustness of various produc-
tivity measures, ‘ . . . when measurement error is
small (or outliers are properly controlled ex post
[parenthesis is ours]), index numbers are among
the best for estimating productivity growth and
are among the best for estimating productivity lev-
els’. Another advantage of the productivity index is
that it allows for a consistent comparison of firm-
level productivity across years. To compare any
two firm-year observations that are transitive, this
indicator expresses a firm’s output and inputs as
deviations from a single reference point. The ref-
erence point is a hypothetical firm that operates for
each 3-digit SIC industry in the base time period,
i.e., 1998, the first year of the annual database,
using the industry average for input shares, inputs,
and output. We perform robustness tests with alter-
native ways of measuring productivity.
Models
To exploit the panel data, we include the lagged
dependent variable to estimate the productivity
to capture unobserved firm heterogeneity. We
confirm our findings with alternative panel analysis
techniques such as the fixed effects or random
effects models. Our key variable of interest, entry
year, however, drops in the fixed effects model
as it is time-invariant. Since we include firms with
two consecutive years of data to include the lagged
dependent variable, there are 1,357,777 unique
firm-year observations in the productivity model.
To avoid biasing productivity regressions with
outliers, we winsorize both tails of the productivity
index by 0.1 percent to remove the most extreme
values. The results do not change with or without
winsorization. We enter both the marketization
index variable and its interaction with entry year.
We include industry, year, and region fixed effects
to the model. Our empirical model for firm
productivity can be summarized as follows:
Productivityit = f(α1 × entry yeari,
α2 × entry yeari × marketization indexit,
α3 × productivityit−1, α4 × firm sizeit,
α5 × ownershipit, α6 × marketization indexit,
industry fixed effectsi, year fixed effectst,
region fixed effectsi). (2)
As noted earlier, we examine exit only during
the 1998–2004 period, because we must rely on
the 2004 economy-wide census to verify exit.
With one observation for each firm-year pair, there
are 851,287 unique firm-year observations in the
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exit models. We use the random effects logit
specification to estimate the model and control for
unobserved firm heterogeneity by including firm
random effects. Our empirical model for firm exit
can be summarized as follows:
Probability of exitit+1 = f(β1 × entry yeari,
β2 × entry yeari × marketizationit,
β3 × productivityit, β4 × firm sizeit,
β5 × ownershipit, β6 × marketization indexit,
industry fixed effectsi, year fixed effectst,
region fixed effectsi). (3)
Hypothesis 1 expects a divergence between
productivity and survival according to entry timing
where and when there are institutional barriers.
To test this hypothesis, we need to show new
entrants are more productive than incumbent firms
(α1 > 0) and they are also more likely to exit than
incumbent firms, controlling for their productivity
(β1 > 0). Similarly, Hypothesis 2 expects that
the divergence between productivity and survival
according to entry timing decreases when institu-
tional barriers are reduced. To test this hypothesis,
we need to show that new entrants’ productivity
requirement (α2 < 0) and their higher exit hazards
become lower with fewer institutional barriers
(β2 < 0). If we find the divergence between
productivity and exit hazard narrows when
institutional barriers decrease, following the spirit
of the difference-in-difference approach (Rajan
and Zingales, 1998; Samaniego, 2009), we can
offer stronger evidence for the role of institutional
barriers in affecting firm entry and exit.
RESULTS
Productivity of new entrants
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and Table
2 displays the estimated productivity models.
In models (1)–(7) of Table 2, we test our
hypotheses with entry year and its interactions
with the marketization index for the whole sample
and for subsamples of each ownership type.
In model (1), the coefficient for entry year is
significantly positive, supporting Hypothesis 1a,
which suggests that the productivity level of more
recent entrants is, on average, higher than earlier
entrants. Specifically, the coefficient of entry year
in model (1) suggests that newer entrants generate
1.03 (= 1 + 0.003 × 10) times more output than
incumbents 10 years older when using the same
amount of inputs. Among the control variables,
firm size is positively associated with productivity.
For ownership type, private firms and collectives
have the highest level of productivity, followed
by incorporated firms and foreign firms and SOEs
that serve as a reference group.2 Model (2)
in Table 2 adds the interaction term between
entry year and the marketization index variable
in order to test Hypothesis 2a. The interaction
term is significantly negative, suggesting that
the productivity difference between new entrants
and incumbents is smaller when there are fewer
institutional barriers, reflected in the marketization
index, thereby supporting Hypothesis 2a. The
main effect of the marketization index, which is
negatively associated with productivity in model
(1), turns positive once its interaction effect with
entry year is added in model (2), suggesting its
effect on productivity is, in fact, conditional on
entry year. As institutional barriers decrease, less
efficient new entrants can enter the market while
overall productivity of all firms improves. For
example, when the marketization index is 3 (at a
low level), the productivity of a hypothetical firm
entering in 1988, evaluating the mean values of all
other covariates, is 0.208, while the productivity
of the same hypothetical firm entering in 1998
is 0.242, suggesting that a firm entering 10 years
later has productivity 3.4 percent higher than the
earlier entrant, after controlling for year, industry,
and region fixed effects. When the marketization
index is 9 (at a high level), the productivity of
a hypothetical firm entering in 1988 is 0.153,
while the productivity of the same hypothetical
firm entering in 1998 is 0.175, showing that the
later entrant has productivity 2.2 percent higher
than the earlier entrant. Thus, the productivity gap
between entrants and incumbents is reduced by 1.2
percentage points (i.e., 3.4–2.2% = 1.2%) when
institutional barriers are lowered.
In models (3)–(7), we examine productivity
differences in each of the five ownership types.
2 The coefficients of year fixed effects (not shown in Table 2)
show a pattern in which the average productivity of all firms
increases over time, suggesting the lower bound of efficiency
among surviving firms rises over time due to the gale of creative
destruction.
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Table 2. The regression modeling of productivity
Whole sample SOEs Collectives Privates Incorporated Foreign
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Entry year 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004 ***
(0.267 × (0.775 × (0.180 × (0.174 × (0.207 × (0.152 × (0.420 ×
10−4) 10−4) 10−3) 10−3) 10−3) 10−3) 10−3)
Output 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.033*** 0.098*** 0.004*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.426 ×
10−3)
Private 0.107*** 0.104***
(0.001) (0.001)
Incorporated 0.070*** 0.067***
(0.001) (0.001)
Collectives 0.097*** 0.093***
(0.001) (0.001)
Foreign 0.067*** 0.064***
(0.001) (0.001)
Marketization −0.012*** 0.430*** 0.106* 0.226*** 0.101** 0.219*** −0.018
(0.001) (0.020) (0.057) (0.052) (0.050) (0.042) (0.096)
Entry year ×
marketization /1000
−0.221*** −0.052* −0.116*** −0.053** −0.113*** 0.004
(0.010) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.048)
Lagged productivity 0.569*** 0.568*** 0.604*** 0.596*** 0.535*** 0.588*** 0.514***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 1,357,773 1,357,773 134,955 208,213 487,851 219,816 306,938
R-squared 0.478 0.478 0.433 0.448 0.424 0.454 0.405
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 3-digit industry, 2-digit region, and year effects are not shown.
The coefficients for the entry year variable are
significantly positive in all five ownership types,
supporting Hypothesis 1a that new entrants are
more productive than incumbents. The coefficients
for the interaction term between entry year and
the marketization index are significantly nega-
tive, except for foreign firms, suggesting that the
productivity difference between new entrants and
incumbents becomes smaller for private, incorpo-
rated, collective, and SOE firms when there are
fewer institutional barriers, supporting Hypothe-
sis 2a. While it is generally true that conventional
firms, i.e., SOEs and collectives, lost ground in
recent years, SOE and collective entries continue
to occur. These newly entered SOEs and collec-
tives, called ‘Neo-SOEs’, are often created by
combining the assets of several SOEs with new
governance and management structures. These
newly entered SOEs need to be more produc-
tive than incumbent SOEs in order to survive.
Otherwise, they can be privatized or incorporated
later. The productivity gap between new foreign
entrants and foreign incumbents is insignificant.
Perhaps, more recent foreign entrants were able to
enter via wholly owned subsidiaries, bringing more
sophisticated technology, as the Chinese govern-
ment relaxed the joint venture requirements with
its accession to WTO.
Exit hazards
Table 3 shows firms’ exit hazards from 1998
to 2004 using the annual industrial survey data.
In model (1), new entrants have a higher exit
hazard rate than incumbents, after controlling for
productivity, supporting Hypothesis 1b. Jointly
with the finding from the productivity regression
in model (1) of Table 2, this finding confirms
Hypothesis 1, which predicts that institutional
barriers will lead to higher productivity but
also higher exit hazards for new entrants than
incumbents, after controlling for productivity. The
exit hazard rate also appears to be conditioned
by institutional variation. In model (2) of Table 3,
we add the interaction between the marketization
index variable and entry year. This interaction
term is significantly negative, suggesting that the
liability of newness is lower where there are fewer
institutional barriers, supporting Hypothesis 2b.
The interaction terms in the logit model require
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Table 3. The random effects logit model of exit decisions
Whole sample SOEs Collectives Privates Incorporated Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Entry year 0.007*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.014†
(0.293 × 10−3) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008)
Output −1.053*** −1.067*** −1.259*** −1.221*** −2.688*** −0.231*** −3.158***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.113) (0.112) (0.185) (0.039) (0.155)
Productivity −0.173*** −0.178*** −0.322*** −0.139*** 0.015 −0.479*** −0.256***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031)
Private 0.013 0.013
(0.012) (0.012)
Incorporated −0.310*** −0.328***
(0.013) (0.013)
Collectives 0.111*** 0.091***
(0.011) (0.011)
Foreign −0.735*** −0.736***
(0.014) (0.014)
Marketization −0.259*** 7.579*** 3.703*** 6.781*** 4.164*** 1.929∗ 14.762***
(0.007) (0.323) (0.679) (0.771) (1.086) (0.902) (2.583)
Entry year × marketization
/1000
−0.132*** −0.048*** −0.143*** −0.144*** −0.110*** −0.081***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 851,287 851,287 154,329 230,417 183,511 109,336 173,688
Wald chi-squared
(d.f.)
27,454.87
(214)***
28,016.09
(215)***
3,144.31
(211)***
5,815.63
(211)***
6,357.10
(208)***
2,040.10
(210)***
2,390.42
(209)***
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †<0.10.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 3-digit industry, 2-digit region, and year effects are not shown.
special attention in interpretation, as this model
is nonlinear and the marginal effect of the indi-
vidual coefficient depends on the value of other
covariates (Hoetker, 2007). We took a graphic
approach to plot these true interaction effects and
examine their z-statistics. The interaction terms
are mostly in the negative area and z-statistics are
also distributed in the negative area.
Again, jointly with the finding from the pro-
ductivity regression in model (2) of Table 2, this
finding confirms Hypothesis 2, which predicts
that the divergence between productivity and
survival according to entry timing decreases when
institutional barriers are reduced. The main effect
of the marketization index, which is negatively
associated with exit hazard in model (1), turns
positive once its interaction effect with entry year
is added in model (2), suggesting that its effect
on productivity is conditional on entry year. For
example, when the marketization index is 3 (at
a low level), the predicted probability of exit of
a hypothetical firm that entered in 1988 is 22.2
percent, while the probability of exit of the same
hypothetical firm that entered in 1998 is 25.4 per-
cent, suggesting that a firm that entered 10 years
later has 3.2 percentage points higher probability
of exit than the earlier entrant. When the
marketization index is 9 (at a high level), the
probability of exit of a hypothetical firm entering
in 1988 is 6.8 percent, while the probability of
exit of the same hypothetical firm entering in
1998 is 6.4 percent, showing almost the similar
level of exit probability.
Our control variables, firm size and firm pro-
ductivity, are negatively associated with exit like-
lihood. We also include the four firm types as
controls, using SOEs as the reference category, in
models (1) and (2) for the whole sample. The coef-
ficient for foreign firms is the most significantly
negative, suggesting that foreign firms have the
lowest exit hazard compared to SOEs, followed by
incorporated firms. Private firms exhibit no signif-
icantly different exit hazard than SOEs. Strangely,
collectives exhibit higher productivity and a higher
hazard rate than SOEs, although both are conven-
tional types. This seemingly contradictory result
requires some elaboration. Many collectives in the
pre-liberalization period were efficient, privately-
owned enterprises disguised as collectives (also
known as Red Hat companies) in order to avoid
expropriation by the state. These companies were
dissolved and recreated as private firms when
private firms were legalized. The transition from
Red Hat to private firms possibly results in the
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observation that collectives are more likely to exit
than SOEs, despite their higher efficiency levels.
In models (3)–(7) of Table 3, we examine exit
hazards in each of the five ownership types. There
are some variations. Entry year is significantly
positive for all types of firm ownership, supporting
Hypothesis 1b that the liability of newness exists
regardless of ownership type, while the magnitudes
of coefficients and significance levels vary by
ownership type. Newly entered foreign firms
are the least likely to exit compared to other
ownership types, reflecting that they enter with
new technology, innovative ideas, or deep pockets
and that they are determined to succeed. The
interaction terms between entry year and the
marketization index are significantly negative in
all five ownership types, suggesting that the
liability of newness diminishes when there are
fewer institutional barriers, regardless of their
ownership types, thus supporting Hypothesis 2b.
Yet, the coefficients are greater for private and
collective types, which are often smaller than other
ownership types and therefore more sensitive to
the removal of institutional barriers.
Robustness tests
We perform various robustness tests with alter-
native measures and samples to reconfirm our
findings. First, we use alternative measures of
institutional barriers. In Tables S1 and S2, we
include a categorical variable, coastal versus
inland , which takes the value of one for the 12
coastal regions and zero for the 19 inland ones,
to capture the fact that coastal regions in China
are more open and liberalized than inland ones.
We also capture the inter-temporal variation with
a dichotomous variable, period , that distinguishes
the pre-WTO period (1998–2001) and the post-
WTO period (2002–2007). Both variables turn
significantly negative, consistent with results in
the main model using the marketization index, a
continuous variable. We also test two other alter-
native variables that capture institutional barriers:
SOEs market share, defined as the proportion of
sales of SOEs to total industry shipment in each
region, and government size, defined as the propor-
tion of state employees to total population in each
region. We collect both variables from the Chinese
Annual Statistics Yearbook . Results show that all
hypotheses are consistent with these alternative
measures of institutional barriers.
Second, we conduct robustness tests with alter-
native methods to calculate productivity. Olley and
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
propose an econometric technique in which an
observed variable is used to proxy the unobserv-
able productivity shock. They assume that input
usage, investment in the former and material usage
in the latter, is a proxy for unobserved productivity
shock. In the Olley-Pakes method, we tend to lose
more than one-third of observations that record
no investment. Tables S1 and S2 shows that these
two alternative measures for productivity generate
results consistent with those using the productive
index, reported in Tables 2 and 3.
Third, our annual industrial survey data have
a firm size threshold. In order to test firm size
bias, we reconfirm our hypotheses with all firms
in the 2004 economy-wide census data, which
list all 1.19 million industrial firms as of 2004.
Table S1 shows that the results are consistent with
those of the annual industrial survey, although
we cannot consider exit and thus cannot test our
exit hypotheses with this one year, cross-sectional
data. As another robustness check, we perform
additional exit analyses for each 2-digit SIC
industry (results are available upon request). Our
hypotheses are consistently supported in industries
where minimum efficient scales (MES) are large
(so the 5 million RMB threshold does not matter)
and in industries where MES are small.
Fourth, we examine whether industry evolution
depends on the life cycle stage. Following the
typology of Maksimovic and Phillips (2008), we
take median points in the real value (inflation-
adjusted) 3-digit industry shipment growth over
1998–2007 and in the change in the number of
firms during the same time period and classify
industries into four types—growth (high growth of
industry shipment and high growth of the number
of firms), consolidating (high growth of industry
shipment and low growth of the number of firms),
technological change (low growth of industry ship-
ment and high growth of the number of firms),
and declining (low growth of industry shipment
and low growth of the number of firms). Table
S3 in the online supplement shows the productiv-
ity regressions for each of the four categories of
the industry life cycle, generating results consis-
tent with the full sample, except the technolog-
ical change subsample. By definition, entry and
exit in industries with technological changes are
more conditioned by technological changes than
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institutional changes. Similarly, Table S4 in the
online supplement shows the exit analysis for each
type of industry life cycle, which generates results
consistent with the full sample.
Last, we consider the possibility that some new
entrants may not be de novo but de alio entrants,
diversifying from other markets (Agarwal et al.,
2002; Mitchell, 1994; Sarkar et al., 2006). De alio
entrants may not be subject to the same level
of the liability of newness as de novo entrants,
because they have incumbency advantages, albeit
in different markets. Given that possibility, we
regard our research design—not distinguishing
de novo vs. de alio entrants—a conservative
test, because the average productivity of de alio
entrants would be lower and their exit hazard,
controlling for productivity, would also be lower
than de novo entrants, making it harder to provide
support for our hypotheses. In addition, we try to
identify whether a new entrant is de novo or de
alio in census-level data such as ours. We take
a 3 percent random sample (17,390 firms) and
manually search for and drop de alio entrants.
Models using only de novo entrants generate
consistent results (available upon request).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Using Chinese census data from 1998 to 2007, a
period when China experienced substantial insti-
tutional changes, we demonstrate a divergence
between productivity and survival when institu-
tional barriers are present, a phenomenon new
to the literature, and further demonstrate that
the divergence decreases when the degree of
marketization deepens and institutional barriers
decrease. By offering a theoretical account for
this phenomenon, we highlight the important role
institutional forces play in shaping the process of
industry evolution.
We contribute to the economics literature by
developing a theoretical framework in which
firms differ not only in physical technology, but
also in social technology (Nelson, 2002; Nel-
son and Sampat, 2001). Our study shows that
firm heterogeneity along such multiple dimen-
sions leads to industry dynamics that differ from
those based solely on economic efficiency. The
combined emphasis on economic and institutional
perspectives is useful to investigate industry evo-
lution in settings where institutional factors matter
(Li and Hitt, 2006; Luo, 2003; Luo and Junkunc,
2008; Tan and Tan, 2005; Tybout, 2000). By inte-
grating these two theoretical perspectives, we push
forward an important agenda to ‘bring institution
into evolutionary growth theory’ (Nelson, 2002),
because development of the institutional environ-
ment can significantly hinder or facilitate eco-
nomic growth (North, 1990).
This study contributes to institutional theory
by exploring a novel mechanism through which
new entrants may respond to institutional con-
straints. Whereas institutional environments pres-
sure entrants to adopt legitimation-based strategies
to adhere to social norms (Suchman, 1995; Zim-
merman and Zeitz, 2002), we show that they
also adopt efficiency-based strategies, previously
unexplored in the literature. We argue that new
entrants rely on technical efficiency to compensate
for their institutional deficiency, while incumbents
rely more on their institutional connections to sur-
vive. This argument offers a new resolution to an
important theoretical tension: while some schol-
ars emphasize organizational homogeneity arising
from conformity pressures of institutional envi-
ronments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), others
recognize the persistence of significant firm het-
erogeneity in many organizational fields (Scott,
2008; Scott and Meyer, 1991). We propose that
organizational heterogeneity persists despite con-
formity pressure because the presence of multiple
environmental dimensions (both institutional and
technical) provides incumbents and entrants with
alternative paths to differentiate and co-exist in
equilibrium.
This study also improves our understanding
of the environmental change in conjunction with
the technology literature. Environmental changes
redefine the basis of competition and affect
the relative advantage of new entrants vis-a`-vis
incumbents. Extending prior work on economic,
technological, and ecological factors (Agarwal
et al., 2002; Sarkar et al., 2006), we examine
the impact of institutional changes. In contrast
to technological change that may destroy incum-
bent firms’ competence (Tushman and Ander-
son, 1986), we find that institutional changes, in
the context of post-liberalization China, are more
gradual in nature, because the market does not
develop overnight. Unlike technological changes,
institutional changes do not directly affect incum-
bent firms’ productivity, they reduce institutional
buffering and expose inefficient incumbent firms
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to the selection environments. Incumbent firms are
gradually replaced by market forces as more effi-
cient firms enter and competition becomes fiercer.
We make an important empirical contribution
by controlling for productivity when examining
firm survival, lending strong, direct empirical
support to the institutional buffering argument.
Our study offers systematic documentation of
entry and exit and productivity patterns and their
interactions with institutional variations using
Chinese census data, similar to contributions by
Dunne et al. (1988, 1989) based on US census
data. This contributes to the recent call in the
strategy field for more empirical regularities and
stylized facts, which can be used to inform theory
development and spur follow-up empirical studies
(Helfat, 2007).
Furthermore, this research sheds some light
on comparative studies across different countries.
Institutional barriers are not China-specific but
common across different countries. For example,
it took 11 days to register a commercial property
in Korea, but it took 33 days in the Philip-
pines (World Bank, 2008). Senior managers in
East Asian developing countries spent as much
as 15 percent of their time working with gov-
ernment officials to interpret and comply with
regulations, while firms in OECD countries spent
about 5 percent of their time doing so (Batra,
Kaufmann, and Stone, 2003). Recent work has
begun to employ comparative studies to under-
stand the impact of institutional environments
but recognizes that unobserved country-level het-
erogeneity and incomparable data make cross-
country comparisons difficult (Bartelsman et al.,
2009; Brown and Earle, 2008). Our study over-
comes this issue, because China’s heterogeneous,
autonomously run regions represent different insti-
tutional environments while country-level hetero-
geneity is controlled for; data across these regions
are comparable because the same method is used
to collect data in all regions. Future studies could
attempt to replicate the present analysis in different
countries characterized by different institutional
settings. Although we exploit some institutional
features particular to the gradual reform process
in China, we believe that the logic and empiri-
cal methods utilized here can be applied to other
countries that experienced institutional transitions
like deregulation and regime change.
Since our primary theoretical objective is to
demonstrate a divergence between productivity
and survival, this study does not attempt to dis-
entangle several alternative mechanisms that may
imply higher incumbent productivity. For example,
incumbent firms may be more productive than
new entrants because they invest for longer peri-
ods to improve their core technologies (Argote,
Beckman, and Epple, 1990; Balasubramanian and
Lieberman, 2010; Lieberman, 1989). Incumbents
might develop complementary assets like down-
stream resources (Mitchell, 1989; Tripsas, 1997),
market-specific knowledge (Sosa, 2009), comple-
mentary technologies (Helfat, 1997), and com-
mercialization capabilities (Lee, 2009). Also, less
productive incumbent firms have already been
selected out of the industry (Hopenhayn, 1992;
Jovanovic, 1982), and it may appear the incumbent
firms’ average productivity is higher than more
recent entrants in a given cross section. In addition
to these learning and selection arguments, some
forms of institutional barriers may grant incum-
bent firms exclusive access to productive resources
that may increase their productivity, a mechanism
termed ‘resource buffering’ by the prior literature
(Aldrich, 1979; Miner et al., 1990).
In the presence of these multiple alternative
arguments, we focus only on the divergence
between productivity and survival, a phenomenon
new to the literature, and propose institutional bar-
riers as a possible explanation for divergence. With
respect to this objective, our hypotheses constitute
a conservative test because the countering forces
make it harder to detect the institutional buffering
effect that suggests higher entrant productivity. To
tease apart our central mechanisms, we rely on
the interactions between entry timing and insti-
tutional barriers, a set of relationships that these
alternative perspectives do not imply. Further, the
survival analysis is not subject to these alternative
explanations since they affect only productivity
and, once productivity is controlled for, they do
not influence exit hazards. Overall, findings from
productivity and survival corroborate each other to
provide consistent evidence for the role of institu-
tional buffering.
The present research has a number of limitations
that may offer opportunities for further research.
We rely on a revenue-based productivity measure,
which may be contaminated by market power in
output and input markets. Future studies should
employ physical output-based productivity mea-
sures to avoid this potential bias. Nonetheless, we
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believe that the revenue-based productivity mea-
sure is a conservative test for our hypothesis that
new entrants will exhibit higher productivity than
incumbents, as incumbents’ market power (and
new entrants’ lack thereof) makes their revenue-
based productivity overstated (understated) com-
pared to their physical output-based productivity
(Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008).
Further, this study employs an economy-wide,
population-level dataset to identify environment-
level institutional factors that moderate firm
productivity and market exit. Future research
could employ a smaller sample and a more in-
depth survey design to examine individual firms’
employment of political strategies to respond to
institutional changes (Jia and Mayer, 2010; Li and
Zhang, 2007; Luo and Junkunc, 2008). An exam-
ination of firm-level political strategies and the
current study’s focus on institutional barriers are
two sides of the same coin, embedded in the same
institutional environment, and could offer comple-
mentary insights.
Last, institutional change parallels a shift in
technological regimes that create or destroy com-
petitive advantage (Agarwal et al., 2002; Sarkar
et al., 2006; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Pro-
ductivity differences may also reflect technological
advances embodied in capital investments, framed
as the ‘vintage capital’ theory in the economic
literature (Caballero & Hammour, 1994; Foster
et al., 2008). Since this study utilizes institutional
variations to isolate our core mechanism, we do
not focus on technological change. Future research
could explore industry-specific factors in selected
industries to understand better how industrial and
technological characteristics help determine the
evolutionary process.
There are several practical implications of this
study. Our results may lead policy makers to
consider how to remove institutional barriers to
achieve smoother, faster economic growth. The
empirical observation of higher productivity of
new entrants does not mean necessarily that the
Chinese economy is filled with new entrants with
sophisticated technology. It may merely reflect
new entrants’ need to possess better technol-
ogy than incumbents’ to overcome institutional
barriers. The high level of liability of newness
and the efficiency required to compensate for
institutional barriers is likely to prevent many other
firms from entering. Because more new entrants
can intensify competition, thereby improving
long-term efficiency, policy makers should strive
to remove institutional barriers to promote more
Schumpeterian competition. In addition, managers
should heed institutional barriers when devising
an entry strategy, strategically determining when
and where to enter. The overall trend of our results
indicates that, as China continues to liberalize,
competition will intensify as more efficient new
entrants challenge incumbent firms that have
relied on institutional buffering. Both incumbents
and new entrants should pay attention to the speed
and extent of further liberalization, which will
determine their relative competitive advantages
and strategies over time.
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APPENDIX. THE TOTAL COMPOSITE MARKETIZATION INDEX FOR 1998–2007
FROM NERI
Provinces 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Beijing 4.89 3.95 4.64 6.17 6.92 7.50 8.19 8.48 8.96 9.55
Tianjin 4.92 4.71 5.36 6.59 6.73 7.03 7.86 8.41 9.18 9.76
Hebei 5.21 4.66 4.81 4.93 5.29 5.59 6.05 6.61 6.93 7.11
Shanxi 3.61 3.32 3.39 3.40 3.93 4.63 5.13 5.28 5.84 6.23
Inner Mongolia 2.93 3.41 3.59 3.53 4.00 4.39 5.12 5.74 6.28 6.40
Liaoning 4.64 4.47 4.76 5.47 6.06 6.61 7.36 7.92 8.18 8.66
Jilin 3.57 3.97 3.96 4.00 4.58 4.69 5.49 6.06 6.44 6.93
Heilongjiang 3.31 3.57 3.70 3.73 4.09 4.45 5.05 5.69 5.93 6.27
Shanghai 5.04 4.70 5.75 7.62 8.34 9.35 9.81 10.25 10.79 11.71
Jiangsu 5.38 5.73 6.08 6.83 7.40 7.97 8.63 9.35 9.80 10.55
Zhejiang 6.41 5.87 6.57 7.64 8.37 9.10 9.77 10.22 10.80 11.39
Anhui 4.39 4.67 4.70 4.75 4.95 5.37 5.99 6.84 7.29 7.73
Fujian 5.70 5.79 6.53 7.39 7.63 7.97 8.33 8.94 9.17 9.45
Jiangxi 4.41 3.90 4.04 4.00 4.63 5.06 5.76 6.45 6.77 7.29
Shandong 5.19 5.15 5.30 5.66 6.23 6.81 7.52 8.44 8.42 8.81
Henan 5.09 4.05 4.24 4.14 4.30 4.89 5.64 6.73 7.07 7.42
Huibei 4.69 4.01 3.99 4.25 4.65 5.47 6.11 6.86 7.12 7.40
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Appendix Continued
Provinces 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hunan 5.09 3.98 3.86 3.94 4.41 5.03 6.11 6.75 6.98 7.19
Guangdong 6.47 5.96 7.23 8.18 8.63 8.99 9.36 10.18 10.55 11.04
Guangxi 4.29 4.39 4.29 3.93 4.75 5.00 5.42 6.04 6.12 6.37
Hainan 4.51 4.70 4.75 5.66 5.09 5.03 5.41 5.63 6.35 6.88
Chongqing 4.39 4.57 4.59 5.20 5.71 6.47 7.20 7.35 8.09 8.10
Sichuan 4.37 4.07 4.41 5.00 5.35 5.85 6.38 7.04 7.26 7.66
Guizhou 3.20 3.29 3.31 2.95 3.04 3.67 4.17 4.80 5.22 5.57
Yunnan 2.89 3.47 4.08 3.82 3.80 4.23 4.81 5.27 5.72 6.15
Tibet 0.00 0.33 0.63 0.79 1.55 2.64 2.89 4.25
Shaanxi 3.45 2.94 3.41 3.37 3.90 4.11 4.46 4.81 5.11 5.36
Gansu 3.36 3.61 3.31 3.04 3.05 3.32 3.95 4.62 4.95 5.31
Qinghai 1.49 2.15 2.49 2.37 2.45 2.60 3.10 3.86 4.24 4.64
Ningxia 2.01 2.86 2.82 2.70 3.24 4.24 4.56 5.01 5.24 5.85
Xinjiang 2.00 1.72 2.67 3.18 3.41 4.26 4.76 5.23 5.19 5.36
Note: The NERI index contains the following 23 subindices, divided into 5 major categories. We use the general index because these
subindices are highly correlated. NERI normalizes each subindex in each province to a value between 0 and 10 in the base year,
2001; a higher value indicates better institutional environments or lower institutional barriers. Subindices in the other years can go
below zero or above 10, to reflect the progress of marketization over time. The total composite index is the equal weight of these 23
subindices.
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